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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION:
NOT BUSINESS AS USUAL	
  
By
David Allen Larson*
Dr. David Dahl**
I.   INTRODUCTION
The authors hope that no one still seriously contends that politics do not affect
arbitration. In fact, it frankly is difficult to understand the most recent United States
Supreme Court decisions addressing arbitration unless one appreciates how those
decisions further the interests of the business community. One cannot make bold
assertions of this nature without at least some explanation, of course, and more discussion
will follow. But the primary focus of this article is on an interesting exception to
businesses’, employers’, and service providers’ seemingly universal embrace of
arbitration processes, particularly mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. Although it may be
difficult to believe given arbitration’s current popularity, not everyone requires his or her
clients to sign mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In fact, some service
providers prefer to avoid arbitration regardless of whether it is arranged pre- or postdispute. So which merchants or service providers are choosing to forgo arbitration and,
more importantly, why do they dislike arbitration? And do politics have anything to with
their choices?
Dictionaries generally provide several different definitions for the word “politics.”
Merriam-Webster, for example, offers no fewer than five different definitions with ten
separate subparts in its “Full Definition” Section.1 The second definition provided
explains that politics can be “political actions, practices, or policies.”2 Although perhaps
not the most informative definition one can imagine, it is helpful for our purposes.
Physicians are not, shall we say, the world’s greatest fans of arbitration. It turns out that
regulatory policies and practices, in other words politics, provide one important reason
why physicians prefer to avoid arbitration. And there are additional reasons that explain
why this particular group of service providers has not followed the “mad rush” to
arbitration. This article will explain why at least one group of service providers,
physicians, do not regard arbitration as the answer to all of their prayers.
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Arbitration clauses frequently appear in consumer and employment contracts,3
and they are not unknown in the healthcare field. Nursing homes and similar facilities
use binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses to reduce litigation expenses.4 Contracts
between patients and individual medical providers, however, are a conspicuous exception
to the otherwise ever-increasing practice of inserting pre-dispute, binding arbitration
agreements into contracts.5
Some commentators believe that eventually medical malpractice will be resolved
in arbitration. Professor Myriam Gilles has suggested, for instance, that “all manner of
tort claims (including negligence, loss of chance, and other allegations of medical
malpractice . . .) could soon be hashed out in the sequestered universe of arbitration.”6
But the authors do not anticipate that physicians will embrace arbitration anytime soon.
On the one hand, is this situation merely the result of old habits dying hard? If so,
then we can expect that eventually mandatory arbitration clauses will appear in
physician-patient contracts much more frequently than they do today. Yet on the other
hand, is there something about arbitration that is so unattractive for physicians that they
will make every effort to avoid it? Keeping in mind that the medical providers are the
ones drafting, and thus controlling, the arbitration clauses, is it not possible to craft
arbitration clauses that provide the same benefits enjoyed by numerous businesses and
employers? Perhaps surprisingly, at least at the present time the answer appears to be
“no.”
Many of the assumed advantages of arbitration such as faster resolutions, lower
costs, and greater confidentiality may not be as compelling when it comes to medical
malpractice claims. First, litigation outcomes are generally quite positive for physicians.
3

It is difficult to quantify the prevalence of pre-dispute arbitration contracts. David S. Schwartz,
Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1284 (2009). Nevertheless, Professor
Schwartz cites researchers who have attempted to assess the frequency of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and
Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 408 (2007) (explaining that fifteen to twenty-five percent of
employers use mandatory arbitration contracts); Linda J Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to
Arbitrate Through Pre-dispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-64 (2004) (finding that about thirty-five percent of businesses an average Los
Angeles consumer might patronize used mandatory arbitration contracts, with the greatest prevalence
(sixty-nine percent) in the financial category). More frequently, scholars give qualitative estimates. See,
e.g., Myriam Gilles, Operation Arbitration: Privatizing Medical Malpractice Claims, 15 THEORETICAL
INQUIRES L. 671, 678 (2014) (asserting that arbitration clauses are “ubiquitous” in consumer contracts
outside of healthcare).
4

Gilles, supra note 3, at 672-74 (reviewing the use of binding pre-dispute arbitration by nursing homes and
similar healthcare facilities).
5

Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury Is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Agreements for Medical
Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 334 (2007) (stating that it is “not yet common” to employ
arbitration in medical malpractice disputes); Gilles, supra note 3, at 681-82 (binding arbitration clauses are
“conspicuously absent from most healthcare contracts”); Ann H. Nevers, Medical Malpractice Arbitration
in the New Millenium: Much Ado About Nothing, PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 45, 50 (2000) (stating that
“arbitration has not been widely used” in medical malpractice); Thomas Pedroni & Ruth F. Vadi,
Mandatory Arbitration or Mediation of Health Care Liability Claims?, 39 MD. BAR J. 54, 57-58 (2006)
(listing twenty states with no reported case law regarding medical malpractice arbitration).
6

Gilles, supra note 3, at 676.
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Physicians understandably are reluctant to accept different resolution processes when
they are not convinced that the outcomes will be equally favorable, much less even better.
Second, physicians generally are shielded from litigation expenses by malpractice
insurance. Thus, arguments about the reduced costs of arbitration are not persuasive to
physicians. Third, while disputes may be resolved more quickly with arbitration than they
would be through litigation, other commonly reported advantages of arbitration—such as
the ability to select your decision-maker, the availability of neutrals with specific
expertise, and privacy—may seem illusory to the physician. Finally, because of the
regulatory environment, in other words “politics,” physicians are very wary of, and
opposed to, compromise judgments and awards in malpractice cases. The perception that
arbitration often results in a compromise decision, a proverbial “splitting of the baby,”
makes arbitration uniquely unattractive to physicians seeking complete vindication for
both professional and personal reasons.
II.   MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS ARE ARBITRABLE

A.   In General
Courts enforce binding, pre-dispute arbitration agreements routinely and medical
malpractice arbitration agreements are not treated differently.7 The goal of this article is
not to review and summarize the United States Supreme Court’s willingness over the past
three decades to assert the pre-emptive reach of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and
enforce pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses even when they include controversial
language such as class action waivers. But a brief review of two of the most recent cases
nonetheless may be helpful, and will suffice to prove the point that this Court believes a
contract should be enforced, particularly if it is an arbitration contract.
In December 2015, the United States Supreme Court rejected the California Court
of Appeal’s determination that a service agreement’s binding arbitration clause
containing a class-arbitration waiver was unenforceable. The agreement at issue in
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,8 did state that it shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act. But the immediately preceding contract section also stated “that if the ‘law of your
state’ makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire arbitration
provision ‘is unenforceable’.”9 When DIRECTV drafted the service agreement and at the
time the class action litigation began, class-arbitration bars like this one were regarded as
unconscionable and unenforceable under California law.10

7

Marmet Health Care v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“The [FAA] statute’s text includes no
exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims.”).
8

DIRECTV Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).

9

Id. at 466.

10

See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).

71

As Justice Ginsburg in her dissent explained,11 this class action litigation had been
underway for almost three years when the Court decided AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion12
and declared that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empts state rules that make classarbitration bans unenforceable. Acknowledging that the phrase “the law of your state”
was ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean “the law of your state to the extent it is
not pre-empted by the FAA,” or “the law of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA,” the court of appeals had interpreted the phrase
against the interest of the adhesive contract drafter DIRECTV.13
When contract interpretation questions arise we generally and correctly attempt to
determine the intent of the parties. If that truly is our concern, then it is genuinely
difficult to imagine how a court could conclude that when these parties signed this
contract in 2007, they not only somehow knew that four years later the Supreme Court
would announce that the FAA pre-empts state law bans on compelled class action
waivers, but that they also wrote that understanding into their contract.14 It is infinitely
more likely that the parties intended the phrase to refer to the law as it existed at the time
that they signed their contract, unaffected by a federal pre-emptive reach that would not
be declared until years later.
In what must be seen as an effort to preserve the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement, however, the majority framed the question as whether “the law of your state,”
can include an invalid law.15 The Court then answered that question by asserting
(speculating?) that California courts would never have made a similar interpretation if
another type of contract other than an arbitration contract had been involved, and thus
failed to place arbitration contracts on equal footing with other contracts.16 Adding that
judicial construction of a statute ordinarily applies retroactively and that the phrase “law
of your state” is not ambiguous, the Court remanded and demanded that the court of
appeals enforce the arbitration agreement.17
Although some might agree with the majority, if arbitration is a “creature of
contract” then the authors maintain that the parties agreed to a contract that should not
have been enforced. Yet the majority was determined to ensure that this binding
arbitration contract was not going to be avoided. Quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.18 and Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,19 Justice Ginsburg reminds us that arbitration must be
11

Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

12

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).

13

Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

14

Id.

15

Id. at 469.

16

Id. at 469-471.

17

Id. at 471.

18

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2011).

19

Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
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based upon “consent, not coercion,” and that “the interpretation of private contracts is
ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.”20 There was
no reason to refer to a consumer’s state law if DIRECTV intended to incorporate state
law as preempted by the FAA.21
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,22 the Court also reviewed
an arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver. Merchants filed a class
action claiming a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. When American Express
moved to compel individual arbitration, the merchants submitted an economist’s
declaration estimating that the cost of an essential expert analysis would be from several
hundred thousand to more than one million dollars although an individual plaintiff’s
recovery would be only $12,850, or $38,549 trebled.23 Although the district court
dismissed the lawsuits, the court of appeals reversed and held that because the parties
would face prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate, the class action waiver was
unenforceable.24
The Supreme Court responded, however, by declaring that “the antitrust laws do
not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”25 The
Court limited the possibility of escaping an arbitration contract when a party could not
effectively enforce a statutory right in arbitration, the “effective vindication” exception,
by stating that the exception only preserved a party’s “right to pursue” a statutory
remedy. The fact that it was financially infeasible or even impossible to prove a statutory
violation does not change the fact that the right to pursue the remedy was not
eliminated.26
Although the majority distinguished the case, the dissent maintained that the
language and logic of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.27 is
undeniable. Citing well-known Supreme Court cases, the dissent explained that the
critical justification for permitting statutory claims to be decided in arbitration is that “a
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.”28 Arbitration clauses should
be enforced only if “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause
of action in the arbitral forum.”29 The arbitration agreement should be set aside if
20

Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

21

Id. at 474 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

22

Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).

23

Id. at 2308.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 2309.

26

Id. at 2311.

27

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

28

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628).

29

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637).
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arbitration would be so difficult that the claimant “will for all practical purposes be
deprived of his day in court.”30 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph further
confirmed that arbitration costs so prohibitive they foreclose consideration of statutory
claims would violate the effective-vindication rule and prevent enforcement of the
arbitration agreement.31
The most important reason for including the preceding brief discussion of two
United States Supreme Court arbitration cases in this article is not to persuade the reader
that they were wrongly decided. Rather, the reason this discussion is included to
illustrate the Supreme Court’s determination to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses
even in the face of strong arguments against enforcement. These cases demonstrate that
the Court will make every effort to enforce arbitration agreements as written.
Thus, the current situation is that courts enforce binding, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements routinely and, as one should expect, medical malpractice arbitration
agreements are not an exception.32 Marmet Healthcare v. Brown, for example, was a
medical malpractice action against a nursing home in which the United States Supreme
Court pre-empted a state legislature’s attempt to limit pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration.33 The Court declared that West Virginia’s state law “prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing
homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that
rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act].”34
In fact, in order to ensure enforceability, the validity of medical malpractice
arbitration agreements has been recognized by statute in thirteen states, including
California.35 California courts, in turn, have upheld arbitration awards to both plaintiffs
and named physician defendants.36 Arbitration agreements mandating arbitration of
medical malpractice cases have been upheld in other states as well.37
30

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 632).

31

Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Greentree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)).

32

Marmet Health Care v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012) (“The [FAA] statute’s text contains no
exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims”).
33

Id.

34

Id. at 1204. The case ultimately was remanded, however, to determine whether the arbitration clauses
were unenforceable under state common law principles that were not specific to arbitration and pre-empted
by the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.
35

David Shieh, Unintended Side Effects: Arbitration and the Deterrence of Medical Error, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1806, 1808-09 (2014).
36

E.g., Anderson v. Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, No. B252061, 2015 WL 139728 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
12, 2015) (finding that arbitrator did not deny plaintiff’s request for a continuance, and upholding
arbitrator’s award to physician defendant); Watson v. Knorr, No. H036430, 2013 WL 1944007 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 13, 2013) (holding that it was for the arbitrator to determine both entitlement to and amount of
costs to be awarded and upholding award of $1,092,797 plus costs to plaintiff against urologist defendant).
37

E.g., Gordon v. Shield, 41 So. 3d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that surgeon did not waive right
to arbitrate by participating in pre-suit investigation required by statute); King v. Bryant, 737 S.E.2d 802
(N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that arbitration agreement was not too indefinite to enforce in a malpractice
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The absence of a state statute specifically authorizing pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate medical malpractice disputes is not a barrier to enforcement of such agreements.
As is apparent from the recent cases noted above, the Federal Arbitration Act has been
interpreted expansively in order to uphold pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
Additionally, all fifty states have enacted statutes ensuring the enforceability of
arbitration agreements in general.38 These statutes and judicial decisions provide strong
authority for enforcing pre-dispute medical malpractice arbitration agreements.39
B.   Arguments to Avoid Enforcement Rarely Succeed
No one should be surprised that agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice
disputes are enforceable.40 Although Section 2 of the FAA does state that agreements to
arbitrate are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract,”41 and although some commentators assert that courts remain
“enraptured” with contract defenses such as unconscionability,42 it has proven very
difficult to escape arbitration clauses asserting contract defenses. Unconscionability
arguments may appear particularly promising because pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
clauses frequently are found in contracts that are adhesive in nature, yet those arguments
rarely are successful.43 In an effort to protect their citizens, state legislatures may enact
legislation expressly limiting the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. But, as
was the case in Marmet Health Care v. Brown, those statutes will be pre-empted because
the court likely will be unable to find that the agreements are “unenforceable under state
common law principles that are not specific to arbitration.”44
Attempts to escape medical malpractice arbitration clauses are occasionally
successful, however. California courts, for instance, have denied motions to compel
arbitration in medical malpractice actions against physicians where waiver or bias has
been found despite a valid pre-dispute arbitration agreement.45 In another situation, where
action against surgeon); Fleming v. Simper, 158 P.3d 1110 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (holding that patient did
not provide clear and convincing evidence that arbitration judgment was procured through fraud).
38

Pedroni & Vadi, supra note 5, at 56.

39

Id. at 57.

40

Gilles, supra note 3, at 689.

41

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).

42

Gilles, supra note 3, at 689.

43

Id. at 688-89.

44

Marmet Health Care v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012) (disallowing a categorical rule against predispute arbitration agreements).
45

Law v. Gorny, No. G046953, 2013 WL 1561512, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2013) (holding that
defendant obstetrician waived his contractual right to arbitration by participating in judicial discovery and
thus prejudicing plaintiff); Gray v. Chiu, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 799 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that
defendant surgeon’s attorney’s undisclosed membership in the same alternative dispute resolution firm as
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none of the defendant physicians had actually signed the arbitration agreement, the
California Court of Appeal refused to order arbitration because the physicians were
unable to establish that they were parties to a valid arbitration agreement—there was no
signature on the line for “Physician’s or Authorized Representative’s Signature.”46
C.   Are Wrongful Death Actions Arbitrable?
While the legal authority supporting arbitration of medical malpractice actions is
substantial, an important issue concerning medical malpractice and arbitration remains
unsettled. In a wrongful death suit, can a plaintiff-survivor be bound by an arbitration
agreement signed by the decedent?
In California, the answer is yes. In Ruiz v. Podolsky, claimants filed a wrongful
death action against the surgeon who treated decedent.47 Decedent and surgeon had
signed an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims that stated it was the parties’
intention to bind all parties, including spouse and heirs, to arbitrate any claim arising out
of treatment provided by the surgeon.48 The California Supreme Court held that the
state’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act allowed patients to bind heirs making
wrongful death claims to arbitration agreements.49 The supreme courts of Florida and
Alabama have come to similar conclusions in cases involving wrongful death actions
against nursing homes.50
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has rejected that position for several different
reasons. In Bybee v. Abdulla, surviving spouse Lisa Bybee filed a wrongful death action
against the physician who had treated her decedent husband Mark for depression.51 The
decedent had signed an agreement to arbitrate all claims arising from the medical care
provided by the physician, expressly binding all persons with claims arising out of care
provided by the physician to the decedent including any spouse or heirs.52 The claimant
arbitrator raised reasonable doubt about arbitrator’s impartiality, and directing lower court to vacate
arbitration award).
46

Pelter v. 1-800-GET-THIN, No. B250124, 2014 WL 5449682, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2014)
(holding that defendant physicians had not established that they were parties to the arbitration agreement,
and thus upholding denial of petition to compel arbitration).
47

Ruiz v. Podolsky, 237 P.3d 584, 595 (Cal. 2010) (holding that arbitration agreement between decedent
and surgeon bound heirs pursuing a wrongful death action).
48

Id. at 586.

49

Ruiz, 237 P.3d at 584.

50

Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, 109 So.3d 752, 762 (Fla. 2013) (holding that arbitration agreement
between decedent and nursing home bound estate and heirs in wrongful death action); Briarcliff Nursing
Home v. Turcotte, 894 So.2nd 661, 665 (Ala. 2004) (holding that administratrix and executor of an estate
“stand in the shoes of the decedent” and have no more power than decedent would have possessed).
51

Bybee v. Abdulla, 189 P.3d 40, 50 (Utah 2008) (holding that decedent’s wife was not bound by
arbitration agreement between decedent and physician, and was not required to arbitrate her wrongful death
claim).
52

The agreement stated:
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asserted she was not bound by the arbitration agreement between the decedent and the
physician. The court recognized a “strong public policy favoring arbitration,” but held
that this policy was insufficient to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration contract.53 The
Utah Constitution promises that the right to pursue a wrongful death claim cannot be
abrogated.54 Furthermore, Utah law recognizes a wrongful death action as a separate
claim, apart from a personal injury claim.55 Finally, the court held that the decedent’s
spouse was not a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration clause.56
Other state courts have also held that in wrongful death actions related to medical
negligence claims against nursing homes, non-signatories cannot be bound to arbitration
clauses signed by decedent.57
In a very recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration of a wrongful death
claim. In Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, the Sixth Circuit considered a nursing
and rehabilitation facility’s arbitration agreement that applied to all disputes, including
wrongful death, that “binds [decedent] Charles Nichols and all persons with claims
through or on behalf of him, including ‘any personal representative, responsible party,
guardian, executor, administrator, legal representative, agent or heir’.”58 Declaring that
the FAA does not alter basic principles of contract law, the court applied Kentucky state
contract formation law and held that the wrongful death claim does not derive from any
claim on behalf of the decedent and that executrix Adrianne Nichols was not a third party
beneficiary of the agreement because the decedent simply had no authority to settle or

We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise
out of medical care rendered or which should have been rendered by Physician after the date of this
Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the
time of the occurrence giving rise to any claim . . . .
Id. at 42.
53

Id. at 43.

54

Id. at 44-45.

55

Id. at 46.

56

Bybee, 189 P.3d at 49-50.

57

Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 976 N.E.2d 344, 361 (Ill. 2012) (holding that a nonparty to a
nursing home arbitration agreement cannot be bound by the agreement in a wrongful death action); Ping v.
Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 600 (Ky. 2012) (holding claimants not bound by decedent’s
arbitration agreement in wrongful death action against nursing home); Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273
S.W.3d 525, 530 (Mo. 2009) (holding that claimants not bound by arbitration agreement between decedent
and nursing home in a wrongful death action); Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 873 N.E.2d 1258,
1262 (Ohio 2007); Boler v. Sec. Health Care, 336 P.3d 468, 477 (Okla. 2014) (holding that arbitration
agreement signed by decedent’s attorney in fact not binding on personal representative and heirs in a
wrongful death action against nursing home); Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 663 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2013).
58

Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols, 811 F.3d 192, 194 (2016).
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affect claims that belong to others.59 The Sixth Circuit Court additionally concluded that
the state law was not pre-empted by the FAA under Concepcion because it did not
categorically prohibit arbitration of all wrongful death claims, but instead held only that
beneficiaries are not bound by agreements signed only by the decedent.60 Furthermore,
unlike the California rule in Concepcion, the Kentucky rule did not make arbitration more
cumbersome, costly, or more procedurally complicated.61
III.   PURPORTED ADVANTAGES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
Academic observers have noted the potential benefits of arbitrating medical
malpractice disputes for both claimants and physicians.62 Chief among the advantages
cited have been quality of the decision-maker, speed of resolution, and reduced litigation
expenses.63
A.   Qualified Decision Makers
Some writers do not believe lay juries possess the competence to decide medical
malpractice cases.64 By allowing specialist neutrals to decide medical tort cases, some
scholars believe results will be more accurate.65 In addition, qualified decision makers
59

Id. at 195-97. The court noted that some jurisdictions hold that beneficiaries are bound by decedent’s
arbitration agreements because under their state law the wrongful death claim is derivative, and some
courts require arbitration even if the claim is not derivative. The court provided the following authorities:
Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752,762 (Fla. 2013) (“[T]he nature of a wrongful death
cause of action in Florida is derivative in the context of determining whether a decedent's estate and heirs
are bound by the decedent's agreement to arbitrate.”); THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F.
App’x. 813, 817-18 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that, under New Mexico law, a wrongful death claim is a
derivative action, and so non-signatory wrongful-death beneficiaries were bound by an arbitration
provision). Similarly, other courts have held that a wrongful-death beneficiary was still subject to a
decedent's arbitration agreement notwithstanding the independent nature of the claim. See, e.g., Allen v.
Pacheco, 71 P.3d. 375, 379 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding that wrongful-death claim was required to be
arbitrated under decedent's arbitration agreement even though claim was independent in nature); see
generally Richmond Health Facilities, 811 F.3d at 196 n.3 (surveying relevant cases); Ping, 376 S.W.3d. at
598 (collecting cases).
60

Richmond Health Facilities, 811 F.3d at 198.

61

Id. at 200.

62

Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203,
227 (1996) (summarizing benefits of arbitration for both claimants and physicians in medical malpractice);
DeVille, supra note 5, at 339-42 (noting the potential benefits of arbitrating medical malpractice disputes,
but also noting that these benefits may be more theoretical than real).
63

Metzloff, supra note 62, at 227; DeVille, supra note 5, at 339-42.

64

Metzloff, supra note 62, at 208.

65

DeVille, supra note 5, at 341; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1021 (1996).
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enhance efficiency of dispute resolution by obviating the need to educate a jury about
medical practice and science.
These advantages of decisional accuracy and efficiency should work to the
advantage of both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs, however, may reasonably fear bias
when decision makers and defendants share the same culture. Will doctors favor doctors?
These fears may be overblown, however, as generally physicians do not serve as
arbitrators.66
In fact, physicians may have more concerns about the biases of neutrals than
claimants. The Kaiser Permanente medical malpractice dispute arbitration process is
probably more transparent than any other.67 Under this arbitration system, all arbitrators
must be members of the State Bar of California, or retired state or federal judges.68 One
claimed advantage of medical malpractice arbitration is the availability of expert
arbitrators, but one quickly can see that medical practitioners are almost completely
absent from the list. Although there are more than 350 individuals listed in the Office of
the Independent Administrator’s “Names of Neutral Arbitrators,” only two individuals
have the title of “Dr.” (which may indicate a medical/health science degree but could
represent a Ph.D. in another field).69 And those two individuals, Drs. Urs Martin
Laeuchli and Lawrence J. Rudd, also are attorneys.70 Given the fact that attorneys are the
66
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individuals who initiate almost all the medical malpractice lawsuits against physicians, it
does not require a great leap of faith to believe that physicians may not trust, or even like,
attorneys. And evidence exists that supports that belief.71 In light of the often strained
and distrustful relationship between physicians and attorneys, no one should be surprised
when physicians hesitate to place their professional futures in the hands of a single, or
even a panel of three, attorney arbitrator(s).
Physicians actually have good reason to prefer a trial by jury rather than either a
trial by a judge or an arbitration before an attorney or a retired judge. Juries find for
physicians in nearly eighty percent of cases.72 There is evidence doctors win malpractice
actions only about half as often when judges decide cases compared to when juries
decide.73 A discrepancy this large is actually quite unusual and does not exist for other
personal injury litigation.74 This discrepancy provides confirmation for survey data that
juries may be predisposed toward physician defendants in malpractice disputes.75
B.   Rapid Resolution
Arbitration generally is regarded as more efficient in terms of time than litigation.
There is no need to select and educate a jury, for instance. There typically is less conflict
over evidence because evidentiary rules usually are much more relaxed. Discovery also
is much more limited. As a result of these time-savings, arbitration claimants do not have
to wait as long for compensation as they do in litigation, and defendant practitioners do
not have to suffer through a lengthy period of uncertainty, self-doubt, and clouded
reputation.
An analysis of 1,452 litigated malpractice claims from throughout the United
States reveals that the average time from opening the claim to closing it was three years.76
In sharp contrast, the 604 disputes between Kaiser Permanente and its members that were
arbitrated in 2014 were closed on average in less than one year.77 Thus, rapid resolution
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of claims is a real advantage of arbitration over litigation for both claimants and
defendants.
C.   Reduced Litigation Expenses
As one would expect, medical malpractice litigation is expensive.78 In addition to
filing fees and attorney’s fees common to any litigation, almost all medical malpractice
claims require at least one, and often multiple, expert witnesses. Due to the great expense
of litigating medical malpractice claims, an aggrieved patient usually needs to retain an
attorney willing to pay litigation expenses until settlement. This has three consequences
for the patient: (1) the patient is unlikely to find an attorney willing to take even a clear
case of malpractice if the damages are small; (2) even if damages are high, and it seems
malpractice occurred, an attorney still will not take the case unless the chance of winning
justifies the expense of suing; and (3) even if the patient triumphs in court, her award will
be substantially reduced after litigation expenses are paid.79 The fact that plaintiffs must
overcome these consequences lends support to the perception that litigation is a more
favorable dispute resolution process for medical practitioners than less costly arbitration.
The first two points are particularly important and will be further discussed below.80
While it is true that arbitrating medical malpractice claims probably is less
expensive than litigating those same claims in court, the fact that a case will be heard by
an arbitrator does not necessarily solve a claimant’s financial problems. Unless the
claimant can work out a contingency fee arrangement with an attorney, upfront fees and
out of pocket expenses (to pay neutrals, discovery costs, and expert witnesses) may still
be quite high for the plaintiff. This can discourage the plaintiff from even initiating a
claim in either forum.81
As compared to claimants, litigation expenses may be much less of a deterrence
for physicians because many, if not almost all, of these expenses likely are covered by
HEALTH PLAN MEMBERS 26 (2015), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/2014-Annual-Report.pdf (93% of
new cases in 2014 were medical malpractice cases).
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79

A 2012 online survey of plaintiff’s attorneys asked about expected damages required to take a case of
medical malpractice. Shepherd, supra note 78. The median expected damages threshold to take a case with
a 95% chance of winning was $250,000. Id. at 187-88. For cases with a 51% chance of winning the median
threshold was $500,000. Id. For cases with a 25% chance of winning the median threshold was $1,000,000.
Id. This same study revealed average contingent fees of about 35%, and contingent fees greater than 40% in
about 8.5% of cases ending in settlement. Id. at 184.
80

See infra Part V.D.

81

See DeVille, supra note 5, at 370.

81

malpractice insurance.82 Although incurred litigation costs may affect future malpractice
insurance premiums, the cost saving advantages of arbitration to the physician him or
herself, and the benefit that defending an arbitration in lieu of a trial may have for
insurance premiums, may be too small to influence a physician’s preference for
arbitration or litigation.
IV.   PATIENTS POTENTIALLY
ARBITRATION

ARE

WELL

SERVED

BY

MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE

If the problem of upfront fees and out of pocket expenses can be overcome, then
the rapid resolution of disputes and the reduced cost of pursuing a claim should make
arbitration an attractive option for the health care consumer. The Kaiser Permanente
arbitration system solves the problem of neutral fees by paying all of these costs for the
claimant if the claimant agrees to waive its party arbitrator.83 In 2014, Kaiser paid the
neutral arbitrator fee in ninety percent of cases.84 Kaiser will also waive the $150
Arbitration Filing Fee in cases of hardship; in 2014 the Office of the Independent
Arbitrator granted a waiver for fifty of the fifty-three requests.85
V.   PHYSICIANS ARE NOT WELL SERVED BY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
In almost every medical malpractice claim, there are at least two parties with an
interest in a finding of non-negligence: the insurer and the physician. The motivations of
these parties are not the same, however. On the one hand, the insurer wants to keep the
total cost (cost of litigation plus awarded damages) of the suit as low as possible. On the
other hand, the physician is less concerned with the cost of the suit, which in most cases
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is entirely covered by the insurer.86 Instead, the physician is apprehensive about
maintaining both a self-image and a reputation of competence.
Physicians are aware they likely will be sued at some point in their careers. A
recent study estimated that physicians in high litigation risk specialties (e.g.,
neurosurgery, general surgery) faced a ninety-nine percent probability of being sued for
malpractice by age sixty-five; physicians in low litigation risk specialties (e.g.,
nephrology, psychiatry) faced a seventy-five percent chance of being sued by age sixtyfive.87
Given these odds, physicians take the risk of a malpractice suit seriously. So long
as physicians have a significant voice in determining the forum where malpractice claims
will be heard, they will have to be convinced that the forum will protect not just the
economic interests of the insurer and physician, but also the intangible self-image and
reputation interests of the physician.
Physicians worry that arbitration will not adequately protect their intangible
interests.88 Physicians seek to be held blameless, and arbitration is perceived as too prone
to compromise.89 Some writers acknowledge this point of view, but do not consider it
reasonable in the context of modern arbitration which protects against trivial claims.90
But even if it is true that arbitration reduces unworthy claims, a physician’s intangible
interests are no less threatened by nontrivial claims.
A.   Arbitration Perceived as Prone to Compromise
Empirical evidence that arbitration is a forum prone to compromise is scant.91 In
this regard, however, perception can be more important than reality. Large numbers of
corporate counsel believe arbitration leads to compromise awards.92 The California
86
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Supreme Court has acknowledged the perception that arbitration is more likely to
produce a compromise decision.93 Judge Richard Posner has commented on “the
splitting-the-difference character of arbitration.”94
A rational physician, believing that she practices quality medicine, may desire her
day in court, a forum seen as less prone to compromise. The feeling is that litigation is
where strong cases are vindicated. And this feeling is reinforced by the success rates
physicians have achieved when malpractice cases are decided by juries. Physicians’
preference for litigation is consistent with a touted corporate strategy: “[A] company that
believes it has a strong legal and factual position may want to avoid arbitration, with its
tendency to ‘split the difference,’ in favor of a judicial forum where it may be more likely
to win a clear-cut victory.”95
B.   Intangible Concerns

1.   Self-Image
A doctor sued for malpractice suffers emotionally and can interpret the lawsuit as
a personal attack.96 Some scholars have hypothesized that the defendant physician’s selfesteem is the dominant nonmonetary concern in a malpractice action.97 To defend herself
from what she perceives as an unwarranted attack on her competence, and to protect her
self-image, a physician seeks complete vindication. Complete vindication cannot be
found in a forum prone to compromise.
2.   Reputational Concerns

a.   Name Clearing
It certainly is true that some physicians value the “name clearing” function of the
that 42-47% of corporate attorneys indicated that they had not used arbitration in certain cases because it
“results in compromised outcomes”).
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judicial process.98 When physicians are accused of negligence, they want their day in
court and the court’s public declaration that the care they provided met or exceeded
professional standards. This interest is similar to the physician’s self-image concern, but
here the desire is for external vindication rather than internal vindication. Just as with
self-image concerns, arbitration is seen as a forum friendly to compromise.99 And a
compromise award does not completely vindicate the physician’s action, but rather does
the opposite—it is a declaration that the physician did something wrong.
It can be argued that because arbitration is private and typically confidential, no
one will know a physician has been named in a malpractice action. Therefore, name
clearing will be unnecessary.
It is impossible, however, for a physician to keep malpractice actions entirely
private. At a minimum, as further explained below, malpractice actions that are open at
the time of credentialing or re-credentialing will be known to hospital re-credentialing
staff personnel, the hospital credentialing committee, the hospital executive committee,
and the hospital board of directors.100 Any money paid on behalf of the physician as a
result of a settlement, judgment, or arbitration award will be known to these same staff
and committee members, and also must be reported to the state medical board in many
states as well as the National Practitioner Data Bank.101 The existence and nature of these
regulatory requirements, of course, provide an example of how politics can influence the
desirability of arbitration.
In addition, medical insurance staff will know of the suit, as will attorneys
involved in the case. Expert witnesses will know of the suit. Finally, close family
members will know of the malpractice action. With the accusation of negligence known
to so many, the name clearing function of litigation remains an important consideration.
b.   Hospital Credentialing and State Licensing
When applying for hospital privileges, a physician must usually report any history
of malpractice claims.102 Jury verdicts and settlements are considered “red flags,” and
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result in greater scrutiny of the application.103 In addition, physicians generally must
undergo a re-credentialing process every two years at all hospitals where they hold
privileges.104 Physicians must update their files with a report of all malpractice claims
paid since they were last credentialed. These settlements, judgments, and arbitration
awards must be explained. So physicians obviously will be worried that any payment
will make it more difficult to obtain or retain hospital privileges.
In addition, some states require malpractice settlements and awards be reported to
the state board of medical practice.105 A report of malpractice can trigger an investigation
and discipline by the licensing board. Thus, because of the rules and politics of hospital
credentialing and state licensing, any money paid as a result of a malpractice claim will
be perceived as career threatening.
c.   National Practitioner Data Bank
Physicians have a powerful interest in not being listed in the National Practitioner
Data Bank (NPDB). Although the enabling legislation for the NPDB, the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) was passed by Congress four years
earlier,106 the NPDB did not begin collecting reports on medical malpractice payments or
adverse licensure, clinical privileges, and professional society membership actions taken
against practitioners until September 1, 1990.107 Among other provisions, it requires that
all payments in satisfaction of a medical malpractice claim be reported to the NPDB.108
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This requirement includes arbitration awards.109 Furthermore, it requires that all hospitals
access this information when first credentialing a physician, and at least every two years
afterwards, so long as the physician remains on the hospital staff.110 A hospital that does
not request this information as required is presumed to have knowledge of the
information in any medical malpractice action.111 The NPDB can also be accessed by
insurers and used to inform decision-making about whether to include a physician in a
provider network.112 Professor Van Tassel has likened listing in the NPDB to being
“blacklisted.”113
To avoid the potentially devastating consequences of mandatory reporting, it is
believed that many physicians are willing to settle only the strongest cases against
them.114 In all other cases, the physician has a strong incentive to litigate.115 And again,
one can see the effect that politics, albeit commendatory and even essential, can have on
the attractiveness of arbitration.
C.   Privacy
Privacy often is listed as one of the advantages of arbitration. For the healthcare
provider, however, this purported benefit is often illusory. As explained above, any
damages paid to a claimant will be known to some hospital personnel and must be
reported during credentialing or re-credentialing. Those payments also must be reported
to the NPDB. In regard to these disclosures, which have significant consequences for
physicians, arbitration is no more private than a trial.
And even though medical malpractice trials take place in an open courtroom,
these trials, generally, are not widely publicized.116 Thus, the promised privacy benefit of
arbitration over a trial may not be compelling for a physician. Any small privacy
advantage that arbitration may offer is heavily outweighed by the self-image and name
clearing advantages of courtroom litigation, as described above.
109
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D.   Physicians Fare Well in Medical Malpractice Litigation
Medical malpractice plaintiffs face daunting challenges. First, a potential litigant
must find an attorney to take her case. Without an attorney, a plaintiff has virtually no
chance of winning a medical malpractice trial.117 In arbitration, however, an aggrieved
patient can pursue a claim without a lawyer. For example, in 2014 twenty-five percent of
claimants in the Kaiser system proceeded pro se.118
Because it is expensive to bring a medical malpractice claim, plaintiffs’ attorneys
turn down many cases. Malpractice attorneys, typically proceeding under a contingent fee
arrangement, decline to take at least eighty percent of the cases offered to them.119 A
plaintiff’s attorney may not take a case because she estimates the chances of winning are
too low, or because damages recovered will be too small to justify the expense of
pursuing the claim.120 The reality is that small claims against physicians simply are not
litigated,121 and most potential claims against physicians are small.122 Because arbitration
may remove, or at least reduce, barriers to asserting small claims, physicians may
reasonably fear that arbitration will increase the number of claims they will have to
defend.
As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that physicians currently enjoy a prodefendant bias in medical malpractice litigation.123 Professor Peters reviewed a large
amount of empiric data concerning jury accuracy and bias in medical malpractice
trials.124 He found that juries decided for plaintiffs in ten to twenty percent of cases where
independent reviewers did not find evidence of negligence.125 An erroneous finding of
negligence in up to twenty percent of jury trials is a disturbing statistic for physicians to
contemplate. At the other end of the spectrum, however, in those cases where
independent reviewers thought there very likely was negligence, plaintiffs won only
about fifty percent of the cases.126 Furthermore, juries find for plaintiffs in medical
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malpractice cases only about half as often as judges do.127 Summarizing the data,
Professor Peters believes that physicians have a genuine advantage in jury trials.128 To
make the case in favor of litigation even stronger, defendants in medical malpractice
trials fare at least as well, and perhaps better, on appeal than do plaintiffs.129 A
physician’s ability to even attempt to vacate an unfavorable arbitration award, in contrast,
is much more limited than his or her opportunity to appeal an unfavorable trial
judgment.130
VI.   CURRENT AND FUTURE STATUS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION

A.   Current Status
The use of arbitration to settle medical malpractice claims appears to be extremely
uncommon in some states, but arbitration is used in other jurisdictions. Nowhere,
however, is it typical to resolve medical malpractice claims by arbitration.131 One
putative advantage of arbitration is that it is private. As discussed above, this advantage
may be more illusory than real, but it does make it extremely difficult to know how
arbitration actually functions in medical malpractice cases.
The best window on medical arbitration, as it is actually practiced in the United
States, is provided by the Kaiser Permanente Health Plan. In California, all Kaiser
Permanente enrollees must sign an agreement to arbitrate, among other things, claims of
medical malpractice by any Kaiser doctor.132 Kaiser provides a wealth of current and
historical information about its arbitration process.133 It is impossible to say if the Kaiser
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arbitration process is typical of medical malpractice arbitration, as every contract between
provider and patient will be different. Nevertheless, Kaiser participates in hundreds of
malpractice arbitrations every year and provides detailed summary data of these
proceedings.
The Office of the Independent Administrator for the Kaiser mandatory arbitration
process reports that in 2014 there were 630 demands for arbitration.134 Of these, 588 were
demands for arbitration of medical malpractice claims.135 If the claimant would agree to
use only a neutral arbitrator, then Kaiser paid all arbitrator fees. In 2014 Kaiser paid these
fees in ninety percent of the cases.136
In twenty-five percent of the cases, the claimant proceeded pro se.137 Although
one of the advantages of arbitration for plaintiffs is that it is at least possible to proceed
pro se in arbitration (whereas it is almost impossible in litigation), in this small sample
pro se claimants did not fare well. Claimants were pro se in only three of the fifty-six
cases decided after a hearing, and the claimant won only one of those cases.138 In cases
that settled before a hearing, the claimant was pro se in only nine percent.139
Fifty-six cases were fully arbitrated in 2014.140 Of these, Kaiser prevailed in sixtyeight percent and the claimant prevailed in thirty-two percent.141 In the eighteen cases
that resulted in awards to the claimant, those awards ranged from $7,000 to $2,181,375
(median award $250,000 and average award $597,342).142 In addition to the fully
arbitrated claims, forty-six percent of claims were settled before a final judgment.143
It is difficult to make a direct comparison between these cases and cases that are
litigated. It may be easier for pro se plaintiffs to proceed in arbitration, for instance, but
at least in this system they did not experience much success. The poor results for the
claimants in the twenty-five percent of cases pursued pro se might have occurred because
they were weak cases, and the claimants were pro se because no attorney would take such
a weak case. Alternatively, the cases might have been reasonable, but the pro se
938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), a California Supreme Court decision critical of Kaiser’s former arbitration
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claimants may have been very ineffective representing themselves. One should note that
not all of the cases involved medical malpractice claims: Only ninety-three percent of the
Kaiser claims were for medical malpractice.144 Furthermore, all of these cases were from
one region of the United States, so comparisons with national data might be misleading.
Keeping these caveats in mind, the Kaiser outcomes nonetheless do seem
consistent with those obtained through litigation. One study indicated plaintiffs receive a
monetary settlement in fifty-six percent of malpractice actions in litigation.145 Plaintiffs
win 26.8 percent of medical malpractice cases that are decided at trial.146 The cases that
proceeded to an arbitration hearing were settled much faster than those that proceed to a
judgment in court.147
Looking at the arbitral awards obtained through the Kaiser data, one might
suspect the physicians’ fear of arbitration is misplaced. But the sample is so small that it
is impossible to draw any reliable conclusions. Obviously more empirical evidence
would be extremely helpful, but it typically is unavailable. While these results do raise
the possibility that physicians will not fair as badly in arbitration as they believe, the
arbitral awards still were not as favorable for physicians as the outcomes in jury trials.
B.   The Future
Although pre-dispute arbitration agreements to decide malpractice claims against
physicians are not commonly used in states such as Minnesota, for instance, this situation
certainly could change.148 Litigation may become somewhat more favorable for
claimants, and correspondingly less for physicians, as legislatures and courts adjust the
balance of power in medical malpractice suits.149 For instance, a new opportunity for
plaintiffs was created when the Minnesota Supreme Court recently adopted the loss of
chance doctrine for medical malpractice,150 a doctrine that is not unique to Minnesota.
And as noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court continues to uphold
arbitration agreements that are particularly helpful for defendants.151 If statutes are
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enacted and court rules adopted that make courtrooms less hospitable to physicians, data
is collected that shows that physicians do not lose more frequently or suffer larger
damage awards in arbitration than in court (including jury trials), and the pro-arbitration
judicial opinions currently being written continue, then more pre-dispute medical
malpractice arbitration agreements likely will be written. Those are some big “ifs,”
however.
Given the potentially severe consequences, physicians understandably are very
concerned about malpractice claims. At least for the time being, they are more
comfortable with judicial processes than they are with arbitration. The comparative costs
inherent in each of these two dispute resolution processes are not likely to sway physician
preference for the courthouse over arbitration. Physicians are more concerned about the
implications for licensing and accreditation (our political environment), as well as for
self-image and reputation, whenever any dollar amount is paid in settlement. And
regardless of whether it is correct or not, the belief persists that a compromise award
resulting in at least some payment is more likely in arbitration than the courtroom.
Of course, prediction is hard, especially about the future.152 This analysis would
change dramatically if some form of the Arbitration Fairness Act was signed into law.
This Act, as proposed in 2015,153 would prohibit binding pre-dispute arbitration
agreements involving consumers. Medical malpractice arbitration may become even
more unlikely. While a binding post-dispute arbitration agreement still would be
possible, physicians probably would not choose this option unless it was perceived as
offering a more favorable forum for vindication than litigation.
One increasingly common employment arrangement may result in more medical
malpractice arbitration. The percentage of physicians in independent practice has been
decreasing for years.154 As doctors shift from being independent professionals to
employees of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and hospitals, they may have
to agree as a condition of employment that both they, and their patients (who will agree
to a similar contract clause), will resolve medical malpractice claims in arbitration. But
although business entities may be more persuaded than doctors to choose arbitration
because of its lower costs, so long as it is significantly more likely that a medical
malpractice claim can be successfully defended before a jury rather than an arbitrator,
these employers still may prefer the courtroom to defend malpractice claims. The
businesses instead may limit their pre-dispute arbitration agreements to the doctors’ own
employment related problems.
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VII.  CONCLUSION
Benefiting from the Federal Arbitration Act and favorable Supreme Court
jurisprudence, pre-dispute arbitration agreements have become the norm in American
life. Even businesses in the medical field such as nursing homes, for example, have
accepted pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a strategy to control the costs of
negligence actions. Physicians, however, have not embraced arbitration as a means of
resolving malpractice disputes.
There are several reasons for this anomaly. First, two of the advertised advantages
of arbitration over litigation—qualified decision makers and lower expenses than
litigation —may not resonate with physicians. Doctors would rather entrust their fate to a
jury of laypersons than a panel of attorneys and retired judges, and doctors are shielded
from the cost of litigation by insurance.
When a physician is accused of malpractice, her overarching concerns are likely
to be internal self-image and external reputation, not economic considerations. The
doctor wants to vindicate her own competence, clear her name, avoid having to declare a
malpractice settlement when credentialing, steer clear of any licensing complications a
malpractice settlement might create and, above all, keep her name out of the National
Practitioner Data Base. The reporting requirements, and the way that these requirements
discourage physicians from choosing arbitration, is an example of how politics have
affected medical malpractice arbitration. These very real concerns often are threatened as
much by a small monetary settlement as by a large settlement. The danger is in the
settlement, not the amount.
Doctors will choose the forum that provides the best opportunity for total
vindication. Under current conditions, that forum is the courtroom. In the courtroom the
physician is protected by the full array of procedural safeguards, can fully utilize
depositions and discovery, and, importantly, can explain her action to a sympathetic jury.
In contrast, arbitration is viewed as a process prone to undesired compromise.
One development could make pre-dispute binding medical malpractice arbitration
agreements more common. Judicial or legislative initiatives might make litigation less
favorable for physicians. This could tip the balance toward arbitration. At present,
however, the unique concerns of physicians make even pre-dispute binding arbitration
unattractive compared to litigation.
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